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A COMPARATIVIST CRITIQUE OF THE
INTERFACE BETWEEN HEARSAY AND
EXPERT OPINION IN AMERICAN EVIDENCE
LAWS'
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*
[D]espite its superficial simplicity this area of the Law of Evidence
seems to resemble a minefield which some judges have not suc-
cessfully crossed ... .
Professor Rosemary Pattenden
In the United States, litigation has fast become trial by expert
following the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. 2
For example, the Jury Verdict Reporter is published annually for
Cook County, Illinois (the Chicago area). For years, the Reporter
has identified experts who testify regularly in local trials. As recently
as 1974, the Reporter listed only 188 regularly testifying experts.'
By 1989, that number had skyrocketed to 3,100—a 1,540% in-
crease. 4 According to the Administrative Office of Illinois Courts,
t Copyright © 1991 Edward J. Imwinkelried.
* Professor of Law, University of California, at Davis; former Chair, Evidence Section,
American Association of Law Schools. B.A., 1967, University of San Francisco; J.D., 1969,
University of San Francisco.
' Rosemary Pattenden, Expert Opinion Evidence Based on Hearsay, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 85,
95.
2 See FED. R. Eviu. 702 advisory committee's note (proposed amendment) ("The use of
[expert] testimony has greatly increased since enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
Andrew Blum, Experts: How Good Are They?: Lawyers for Plaintiffs, Defense Try to Decide,
NAT'L L.J., July 24, 1989, at 1, 38.
' Id. at 38.
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in 1987 "Cook County averaged at least one expert per trial." 5
 The
expert has assumed a virtually ubiquitous role in contemporary
litigation.
Although commentators often refer to the "role" of the expert
at trial in the singular, in truth an expert witness can play one of
three very different roles.6
 In some cases, an expert testifies exclu-
sively to facts.' Assume, by way of example, that an accused is
charged with rape. The alleged victim testifies that, during the rape,
she dug her fingernails into the rapist's chest and scratched him
badly. The day after the alleged rape, by happenstance, the accused
visited his physician. During the visit, the accused removed his shirt
and the physician examined the accused's upper torso. The physi-
cian could testify that there were no scratches on the accused's chest.
Like a layperson, the physician would be permitted to testify to that
fact. The physician could qualify as an expert to testify to various
opinions, but the physician's expert status does not render her
incompetent to relate facts of which she has personal knowledge.
At the polar extreme, an expert may testify solely about general
technical principles. 8 In the rape case, for instance, the accused
might call a psychologist as another defense witness. The accused
could attempt to elicit the psychologist's testimony about the general
unreliability of eyewitness testimony. A minority of courts admit
this type of testimony. 9 In many of those jurisdictions that admit
such testimony, however, the expert must stop short of opining that
any particular witness, such as the complainant in the rape case, is
mistaken.m Although the research to date supports some general-
izations about the effect of factors such as stress on the accuracy of
5 Id.
▪ RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 519 (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter
EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES].
• Id.
8 Id. The Advisory Committee note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of opinions.
The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes that
an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or
other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to
the facts.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
9
 PAUL C. GIANNELL.1 & EDWARD J. IMWINICELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EvintNcE 9-5, at 294-
95 (1986 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].
10 Robert P. Mosteller, Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Con-
cerning Social Framework Evidence, I.Aw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, 85, 101-02, 115,
118-19.
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eyewitness perception, the state of the psychological art does not
permit the expert to diagnose a particular witness as being mis-
taken." Thus, the defense counsel may not invite the psychologist
to apply generalizations to the specific facts of the pending case and
speculate that the complainant's identification of the accused rapist
is untrustworthy.
As we have seen, at trial an expert witness can testify either
exclusively about facts or solely about general theories. In the typical
case, the expert also plays a third role: the expert derives an opinion
about the significance of the facts in the instant case by applying a
general principle or theory to those facts.' 2 For example, consider
a variation on the rape hypothetical. The accused calls a psychiatrist
as the next defense witness. Pursuant to court order, the psychiatrist
examined the complainant before the trial. Based on that exami-
nation, the psychiatrist is prepared to testify that the complainant
suffers from a psychosis which produces sexual delusions that the
complainant cannot distinguish from real events. In this variation
of the hypothetical, the expert is prepared not only to vouch for a
general theory, such as the symptomatology for the psychosis, but
also to apply the general theory to the specific facts of the com-
plainant's case history to form an opinion about the complainant's
credibility.
When the expert testifies in this third mode, the expert's tes-
timony has a syllogistic structure.' 3 The constituent parts of a syl-
logism are the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclu-
sion." In this mode of testimony, the major premise is the
underlying technical principle—often a scientific proposition' 3—
that serves as the expert's general explanatory theory.' 6 In the rape
hypothetical, the defense psychiatrist's major premise might be that
if a person exhibits symptoms A, B and C, she probably suffers from
" Stephen C. Pass, Questioning the Research on Eyewitness Reliability, 1987 PRACTICAL
PROSECUTOR 15, 16.
' 2 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 'Bases' of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, The Rases' of
Expert Testimony].
Id.
"
15 In a National Center for State Courts survey of judges and attorneys, forty-four
percent indicated that they encountered scientific evidence in at least thirty percent of their
cases. Study to Investigate Use of Scientific Evidence, NAT'L CNTR. FOR STATE COURTS REP., Aug.
1980, at 1.
18 lmwinkelried, The 'Bases' of Expert Testimony, supra note 12, at 2.
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mental disease D. The expert's minor premise is the case-specific
data to which the expert applies the major premise. In the rape
prosecution, the defense psychiatrist would search the complain-
ant's past to determine whether she has displayed symptoms A, B,
and C. The application of the major premise to the minor premise
yields the conclusion, an opinion relevant to the facts of conse-
quence in the pending case.
Although it is relatively simple to describe the structure of the
expert's testimony, in Professor Pattenden's words "this area of the
Law of Evidence" has proven to be "a minefield" for many courts.°
Suppose that to persuade the jury to accept the expert's major
premise, the witness's proponent asks the expert to mention other
authorities who subscribe to the same theory. May the expert detail
the research of these other authorities without producing the au-
thorities in court? The proponent might go further. The proponent
might request that the expert identify and cite a treatise in the
expert's field that describes the research validating the hypothesis
on which the expert relies. Must the treatise be a standard work in
the expert's discipline?" May the expert go so far as to quote the
precise passage that supports the expert's position? These questions
are troubling courts in the United States.' 9
Although the above questions concern the expert's major prem-
ise, other controversies bedevil the expert's minor premise. All
courts agree that the expert should be permitted to factor infor-
mation into her minor premise when the expert has firsthand
knowledge of the information. 20
 What if, however, the expert lacks
personal knowledge of the information? Rather, the expert intends
to rely on the oral reports of third parties. Those third parties,
however, will not appear at trial, and there will not be any indepen-
dent evidence corroborating their reports. May the expert never-
theless base her opinion on such reports? if so, under what circum-
17
 Pattenden, supra note 1, at 95.
1 ' For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Comment, Learned Treatises as Direct
Evidence: The Alabama Experience, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1169.
'g See, e.g., Schuchman v. Stackable, 555 N.E.2d 1012 (1990).
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 14, at 35 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
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stances? 2 ' For years, these questions have divided American courts 22
and commentators. 25
The common denominator of these questions is that they in-
volve the interface between expert opinion and hearsay. Neither
evidentiary doctrine was invented in the United States. Quite to the
contrary, courts in the United States imported both doctrines from
England.24 Furthermore, the courts in other common-law jurisdic-
tions have grappled with the same questions now facing courts in
the United States. 25 Admittedly, the issues tend to arise more fre-
quently in the published United States opinions, 26 but courts
throughout the common-law world have encountered identical
problems." Divergence of authority has persisted in the United
States despite the voluminous literature produced by evidence com-
mentators here. This is an appropriate time to bring a comparativist
perspective to bear on these issues. An examination of the experi-
ence in other common-law countries will assist the courts in the
United States struggling with the questions of expert testimony and
hearsay.
The first section of this article describes the common-law ra-
tionale for admitting expert opinion testimony, a rationale to which
most common-law jurisdictions, including the United States, still
adhere. That basic rationale is the point of agreement among the
common-law judicial systems. The second section of the article de-
scribes and contrasts the differences between expert opinion rules
in the United States and the rules in effect in other common-law
71 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases
of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986).
" Compare In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 275-79 (3d Cir.
1983) (trial court does not determine whether bases of expert opinion are of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the field) with In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp, 1223, 1243-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (trial court does determine whether bases of expert
opinion are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field). See generally 2 GREGORY
P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBIJRG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE
STATES § 52.3 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
23 Compare Carlson, supra note 21, and Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert
Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234
(1984) with Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response
to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1987).
24 MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 244. See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Anthony Kenny, The Expert in Court, 99 LAw Q. REV. 197 (1983).
26 RUPERT CROSS, EVIDENCE 425 (D.L. Mathieson ed„ 4th N.Z. ed. 1989).
22 See SIDNEY L. PHIPSON ET AL., PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE 826-27 (M.N. Howard et al.
eds., 14th ed. 1990); PETER K. MCWILLIAMS, CANADIAN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 258-59 (2d ed.
1984); H.A. Hammeimann, Expert Evidence, 10 Mon. L. REV. 32 (1947).
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countries. In describing the various rules, this section emphasizes
their relationship to the hearsay doctrine. This section also dem-
onstrates that, while courts in the United States have been mare
reluctant than other common-law courts to permit experts to refer
to technical literature to elaborate their major premise, the United
States courts have gone much farther than most common-law juris-
dictions in allowing experts to include otherwise inadmissible hear-
say reports in their minor premise. The third and final section of
the article assesses the differences demonstrated in the second sec-
tion. This section argues that the rules followed in most of the
common-law world are preferable to the rules in force in the United
States because the latter rules more closely follow the basic rationale
for admitting expert opinion.
I. A POINT OF AGREEMENT THROUGHOUT THE COMMON-LAW
WORLD: THE GENERAL RATIONALE FOR ADMITTING EXPERT
OPINION EVIDENCE
All common-law systems adhere to the same basic rationale for
admitting expert testimony. As section II of this article points out
below, the differences between the approaches to expert opinion
problems taken in the United States and other common-law juris-
dictions are marked. Those differences are all the more remarkable
because all common-law systems, including the United States', begin
with an identical starting point for analyzing expert opinion prob-
lems.
A. The Development of the Rationale in Other Common-Law
Jurisdictions
As is still true today, the early English common-law evidentiary
norm was that a witness should recite facts rather than opinions. 28
Although the norm held true in other common-law countries such
as Canada,29
 there is a long tradition of reliance on experts in the
common-law world." The tradition dates back to the fourteenth
century. 31
 In a mayhem case in 1345, surgeons were summoned
28
 SIR RUPERT CROSS ET AL., CROSS AND WILKINS OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 159
(Colin Tapper ed., 6th ed. 1986); John Hasten, The Court Expert in Civil Trials —A Comparative
Appraisal, 40 Mon. L. REV. 174, 175-76 (1977). 	 "-
s8 J.L. Clendenning, Expert Testimony, 9 CRIM. L.Q. 415, 417-18 (1966-67); R.A. Huber,
Expert Witness, 2 CRIM. L.Q. 449, 450 (1959-60).
" Hasten, supra note 28, at 175.
81 Id. at 190.
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from London to determine if the alleged victim's wound was fresh. 52
By the middle of the sixteenth century, expert testimony had be-
come a routine practice." In many of the old cases, the expert
served as the functional equivalent of a juror" but the modern role
of the expert witness emerged when the jury's role changed to that
of forming opinions from the facts presented. 55 Folkes v. Chad," a
1782 opinion by Lord Mansfield, is usually cited as the seminal
case." In Folkes, the court permitted a partisan expert," Mr. Smea-
ton, to give expert engineering testimony on the question of
whether an embankment had caused the silting of a harbor."
The justification advanced for admitting expert opinion such
as Smeaton's testimony was a necessity rationale; the question before
the court was a technical matter exceeding the court's competence.°
The trier of fact had to decide whether to draw a particular infer-
ence, and the expert was in a better position to make that decision
than the normal layperson.'" The expert was in a superior position
to do so because the expert had special ability, 42 that is, knowledge
or skill the average layperson lacked. It was recognized early that
the essence of a witness's expertise is the possession of knowledge
or skill that better enables the witness to decide whether to draw a
particular inference.45
This rationale for admitting expert opinion is reflected in both
the definition of expert and the traditional method of presenting
expert testimony. The common-law world defines an expert as a
32 Id. at 175; C.D. NOKES, AN INTRODUCTION TO EVIDENCE 176 (4th ed. 1967).
" Basten, supra note 28, at 175; FRANK BATES, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 219 (3d ed.
1985); CROSS, supra note 26, at 429.
34 Basten, supra note 28, at 175. At early common law, jurors were the source of the
facts presented; jurors were drawn from the local community on the theory that members
of that community were most likely to have information about the facts in issue. JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1800 (Chadbourn rev. 1976). As Basten
indicates, the jurors' role then evolved into one of drawing conclusions based on testimony
furnished by independent witnesses.
Basten, supra note 28, at 175.
" 99 Eng. Rep. 589 (K.B. 1782).
57 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 239; Basten, supra note 28, at 176; J.H. Hollies, Hearsay
as the Basis of Opinion Evidence, 10 CRIM. L.Q. 288, 291 (1967-68).
°I Basten, supra note 28, at 176.
Folkes, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590.
4° Clendenning, supra note 29, at 418; Huber, supra note 29, at 450.
4 ERIC J. EDWARDS, CASES ON EVIDENCE IN AUSTRALIA 760 (3d ed. 1981); Huber, supra
note 29, at 450.
C.D. NOKES, supra note 32, at 177.
" Id.
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person who has special knowledge or skill." A scientist qualifies as
an expert, enjoying such status because of special knowledge gained
by formal study and systematic research. Similarly, an automobile
mechanic can qualify as an expert on diagnosing the cause of an
engine failure; the mechanic possesses unique diagnostic skill de-
veloped through practical experience. The expert's knowledge or
skill becomes the source of the expert's major premise45—a propo-
sition about the symptomatology of a psychosis or the cause of a
certain type of brake failure. To qualify as an expert, the witness
need not know anything about the facts of the instant case; the
witness may have no personal knowledge at all of the data that will
serve as the minor premise at trial. The expert's distinguishing
characteristic is the possession of knowledge or skill that equips the
expert with a major premise that she can apply to the specific facts
of the pending case.
The traditional method of presenting expert evidence reflects
the same underlying rationale. The common law developed a special
form, the hypothetical question, to permit the expert to apply her
special knowledge or skill to the facts of the instant case." In this
method, the attorney initially asks the expert to assume the truth
of certain facts47—data forming the minor premise in the syllogism.
The attorney then asks the expert whether, based on those assumed
facts, she can form an opinion or draw an inference on a specified
topic. If the witness answers in the affirmative, the attorney lastly
requests that the expert state the opinion. Even if the witness has
no pretrial exposure to the facts of the case, much less any personal
knowledge of the facts, the witness can opine in response to the
hypothesis. Despite her ignorance of the case-specific data, the wit-
ness can serve as an expert and offer an opinion. The witness can
do so because the essence of expertise is the ability to supply the
major premise. The witness need not have any firsthand knowledge
of the facts listed in the hypothesis; those facts were to be proven
by other witnesses."
44 The civil-law definition of expert is similar to that of the common-law definition. See
Hammelmann, supra note 27, at 36 ("Continental systems define an expert as a person who
conveys to the tribunal scientific information on abstract questions of fact.").
" See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of an expert's major
premise.
46
 MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 14 at 35-37, 4 16 at 41.
47 Id. § 14 at 35.
" Id. §. 14 at 37; LEONARD H. HOFFMAN & D.T. ZEFFERTT, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF
EVIDENCE 101 (4th ed. 1988) ("on the basis of facts proved by others"); Kenny, supra note
25, at 199.
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In summary, to qualify as an expert at common law, it is both
necessary and sufficient that the witness have special knowledge or
skill that can serve as the source of the witness's major premise. If
the witness possesses such knowledge or skill, the common law of
evidence confers expert status on the witness. The witness does not
need any acquaintance with the facts of the pending case to fall
within the common-law definition of expert. Thus, the witness typ-
ically functions as an expert at trial by applying a major premise,
drawn from her special knowledge or skill, to facts independently
established by other witnesses. In the common-law scheme, the
expert is not an official fact finder" whose expertise lies in deter-
mining credibility. Rather, the expert's essential function is to bring
specialized knowledge and skill to evaluate facts proven by other
witnesses. The witness's expertise relates to the major premise in
the syllogism, not the minor premise.
B. The Adoption of the Rationale in the United States
United States jurisdictions have adopted the same rationale for
introducing expert opinion evidence. Just after the turn of this
century, Learned Hand published his classic article on expert tes-
timony. 5° In the article, Judge Hand relied heavily on cases and
writings from other common-law jurisdictions. 5 ' After reviewing
cases, such as Mites, that discussed the rationale for admitting ex-
pert opinion,52 Judge Hand endeavored to define the role of the
expert in.a United States courtroom. Hand echoed the English cases
in asserting that "Nile whole object of the expert is to tell the jury,
not [the] facts [of the instant case], . . . but general truths derived
from his specialized experience." 53 The trier of fact has the ultimate
responsibility to determine credibility and the merits of the case."
Drawing on his extraordinary knowledge or skill, however, the ex-
pert can contribute to the fact-finding process by apprising the trier
of "general truths" of which the typical layperson is ignorant. 55
In several respects, the Federal Rules of Evidence demonstrate
the continuing vitality of this rationale for introducing expert tes-
49
 Hollies, supra note 37, at 290.
59 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901-02).
51 See id. at 42-49.
52 Id. at 48 & n.1.
55 Id. at 54.
See ed. at 55-56.
55 Id. at 55.
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timony. Rules 702 to 706 govern the admissibility of expert opin-
ion. 56
 The first paragraph of the advisory committee note to Rule
702 declares that "an intelligent evaluation of facts is often difficult
or impossible without the application of some scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge. The most common source of this
knowledge is the expert witness .. ." 57 The text of Rule 702 likewise
is premised on the common-law model. Rule 702 defines an expert
as a person qualified by special "knowledge [or] skill." 58 The rule
sanctions the admission of expert opinion when an expert can draw
an inference completely beyond a layperson's capability as well as
when the expert can augment significantly the reliability of an in-
ference barely within a layperson's grasp. 59 The rule broadly per-
mits expert testimony whenever "common sense" suggests that the
"untrained layman" trier of fact will gain "enlightenment from those
having a specialized understanding of the subject." 60
 As at common
law, Federal Rule 705 allows the witness's proponent to use a hy-
pothetical question to provide the expert with the minor premise
to which the expert will apply the major premise.6 ' Hence, it re-
mains true in the United States today that a witness's complete
ignorance of the minor premise information neither precludes the
witness from qualifying as an expert, nor bars the presentation of
the witness's opinion at trial.
II. THE POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD:
THE SPECIFIC EVIDENTIARY RULES RESTRICTING THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF EXPERT OPINION
In the United States and the rest of the common-law world,
the courts have developed not only a general rationale for admitting
expert opinion, but also specific rules to regulate the admission of
expert testimony. Although all common-law jurisdictions employ
the same basic rationale as their initial premise, rules governing the
3°
 FED. R. Evio. 702-06.
37 Id. 702 advisory committee's note.
33
 Id. 702.
" David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles, and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the
Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 Oa. L. REV. 414, 418
(1987).
150 FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note (quoting Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony,
5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952)).
Al Id. 705 advisory committee's note (the proponent may use the hypothetical question
technique "if he chooses").
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admission of expert testimony in the United States differ signifi-
cantly from the rules in effect in most other common-law countries.
A. The Specific Evidentiary Rules in the United States
1. The Admissibility of Evidence Relating to the Expert's Major
Premise
To understand the United States law governing the admissibil-
ity of evidence relating to an expert's major premise, it is critical to
distinguish between two questions. The first question arises when a
judge is ruling on the admissibility of the expert testimony. The
judge may make the ruling either on a pretrial in limine motion or
out of the jury's hearing at trial. The question is whether the judge
may consider an expert's reference to other experts' research or
quotations found in texts written by professionals in the particular
field of expertise. Most judges in the United States answer that
question in the affirmative. There are several theories for permit-
ting the judge to do so.
One theory is that technical exclusionary rules, such as the
hearsay doctrine, are inapplicable to this stage of the judge's deter-
mination of the admissibility of the evidence. Federal Rules of Ev-
idence 104(a)—(b) prescribe the procedures the judge must follow
in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. For example, when the
judge passes on the admissibility of expert opinion, Rule 104(a)
controls. 62 The last sentence of the rule states that "Din making
[her] determination [the judge] is not bound by the rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges." 63 That sentence renders the
limitations of the hearsay rule inapplicable to the information the•
judge considers before ruling on admissibility. 64 Thus, if the op-
ponent objects on the basis that the witness's references to other
experts' research amount to inadmissible hearsay, the expert's pro-
ponent can respond that the hearsay objection is inapposite at this
point in the proceeding.
Not all jurisdictions take the position that the technical exclu-
sionary rules are inapplicable to the judge's admissibility determi-
" In pertinent part, Rule 104(a) states that "[p]reliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court." FED. R. Ewa 104(a).
83 Id.
64 State v. Cardone, 368 A.2d 952, 955 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 75
NJ. 3 (1977).
12
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nation.65 Even in jurisdictions extending the exclusionary rules to
the judge's ruling, however, the expert's references and quotations
can sometimes be admitted as nonhearsay. Hearsay can be defined
roughly as an out-of-court assertion offered to prove the truth of
the assertion. 66 In many cases, the theory of logical relevance for
offering the references to outside research does not require that
the trier treat the references as proof of the truth of the assertion.
Therefore, hearsay is not an issue. That is, when the references are
logically relevant for a purpose other than for their proof of their
assertions, the references are nonhearsay and, consequently, ad-
missible over a hearsay objection.
The so-called Frye test is the underpinning of one nonhearsay
theory for admitting expert opinion evidence. Under the teaching
of Frye v. United States, scientific evidence is inadmissible unless the
evidence is based on a theory or technique that is generally accepted
within the pertinent scientific circles. 67 The majority of American
jurisdictions still subscribe to the Frye test for the admissibility of
scientific testimony." Under Frye, the expert's proponent has a ten-
able argument that references to other experts' research are non-
hearsay.
One common nonhearsay use of evidence is as a verbal act or
operative fact. 69 Suppose, for example, that the issue is whether the
plaintiff and defendant entered into a valid contract. Under the
objective theory of mutual assent, the plaintiff may introduce tes-
timony about the plaintiff's and defendant's statements during their
negotiations. If the statements agree, the agreement is the proof of
mutual assent that forms the contract." Legal consequences flow
directly from the operative fact that the contents of the statements
agree. The proponent of the expert's references can argue by anal-
ogy. Under Frye, the pivotal question is whether the majority of the
experts in the discipline agree on the validity of the theory. The
proponent need not offer the out-of-court experts' statements for
their truth; rather, the proponent can argue that in and of itself,
" EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., CALIFORNIA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 3-4 (1988)
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS]; MCCORMICK, supra note 20, 53 at
135-39.
66 FED. R. EVID. 801(a)—(c).
" 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (no. 3968).
68 G1ANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 1-5 at 10-11.
89 EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES, supra note 6, at 577.
1° EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, CONTRACT LAWSUITS: TRIAL STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES
§ 5-4a, at 66 (2d ed. 1989).
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the agreement between and among the statements establishes the
general acceptance demanded by Frye.'" Consequently, the judge
can consider the other experts' statements in ruling on the admis-
sibility of the opinion.
The second, more difficult, question is whether the expert may
refer to other experts' research and quote their works in the hearing
of the jury, after the judge has ruled the expert's opinion admissible.
At this stage, the proponent can no longer rely on the theories
discussed in the preceding paragraphs because exlusionary rules
such as the hearsay doctrine unquestionably apply at the trial on
the merits. Hence, the proponent cannot rely on the last sentence
of Rule 104(a). Moreover, if the judge has ruled the evidence ad-
missible, compliance with Frye is no longer in issue. For that reason,
the proponent cannot characterize the references as nonhearsay on
the theory that the very agreement among the statements proves
general acceptance; the issue of general acceptance is for the judge
rather than the jury. 72 At this point, the existence of general accep-
tance has ceased to be an issue.
In some cases, however, there are theories the proponent can
successfully invoke to rationalize presenting the expert's references
to the jury." One theory is that the references constitute nonhear-
say. Like the use of statements as verbal acts, "mental input" is a
widely recognized nonhearsay use of evidence. 74 In a given case,
the issue might be whether the manufacturer of a product knew
that the product had a tendency to malfunction. Under the sub-
stantive law, the manufacturer's knowledge might trigger a duty to
redesign the product or entitle the plaintiff to exemplary damages.
To prove knowledge, the plaintiff could offer testimony that some-
one .told the manufacturer that his product had the tendency to
7 ' CI State v. Cary, 239 A.2d 680, 684 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (outside statements
by other experts revealing disagreement over the accuracy and reliability of voiceprint
identification were admissible to prove that the identification device lacked general scientific
acceptance); EDWARD J. 1MWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
§ 4-5(B), at 134-35 (1982) [hereinafter Mr:limos OF ATTACKING Somme EVIDENCE].
" People v. King, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Edward J. lmwinkelried,
Judge Versus fury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility
of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 577,579 (1984).
73 Capps v. Manhart, 458 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Neb. 1990) ("Expert witnesses quite often
rely on sources of research and literature as basis of their opinions, and a reference to those
sources during testimony does nut reduce that testimony to hearsay. One of appellant's
experts even made reference to 'the literature' in describing the effect of calcium hydroxide
in dentistry. The literature referred to by the appellee was not offered as independent
evidence of its truth .. .").
74 EVIDENCE IN THE. NINETIES, supra note 6, at 578.
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malfunction. The statement would put the manufacturer on notice
of the product's tendency. 75 An expert's proponent might contend
that the expert's references to other experts' research and reports
are admissible on a theory parallel to the "mental input" theory.
The proponent can urge that she has the right to show that the
expert is reasonable in accepting the major premise, for example,
a particular scientific theory. The fact that the expert has read
articles by leading researchers vouching for the theory makes it
more sensible for the expert to subscribe to the theory. The refer-
ences would then be logically relevant on a nonhearsay theory to
help convince the jury that the expert's opinion is "better grounded
and more trustworthy." 76
The dilemma, of course, is that the proponent often desires to
offer the references on a hearsay theory as well. Ultimately, the
proponent wants to persuade the trier of fact that the expert's major
premise is valid. 77 As a practical matter, at least when the opposing
attorney is a skilled advocate, the proponent must argue to the jury
that the expert's underlying theory is valid; if the proponent does
not, the expert's testimony is vulnerable. A skilled opposing attorney
will treat the expert's credibility and the theory's validity as alter-
native points of attack.78 Therefore, the opposing attorney will ar-
gue to the jurors that, for example, even if the expert is a sincere,
reasonable person, they should reject the theory because there has
been no direct evidence of its experimental verification.
Hearsay issues arise, however, as soon as the proponent asks
the expert to describe research by other experts. The other re-
searchers to whom the expert witness makes reference are out-of-
court declarants. 79 In effect, the references to the other researchers
are assertions that their experimentation has validated the theory,
and the proponent wants the trier of fact to reach precisely that
conclusion. References to either the research or quotations from
written research summaries then would constitute hearsay. 8° Thus,
if the proponent offers the references and quotations for the truth
of the asserted validity of the principle, the proponent becomes
obliged to find an applicable hearsay exception. Unfortunately,
79 Id.
76 Id.
" See FED. R. Evil). 901(6)(9).
79 THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 71, chs. 9-10.
79 FED. R. EVID. 801(b).
B° Id. 801(a)—(c).
December 19911	 EXPERT—HEARSAY INTERFACE	 15
modern American evidence law affords only a single, narrow hear-
say exception to which the proponent can cite.
The exception is the learned treatise doctrine.8 ' This doctrine
excepts from the hearsay exclusion published treatises and like
materials that are established as a reliable authority in their field. 82
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, this
exception was a distinct minority view; 83 a little more than a handful
of states recognized the exception." With the adoption of a version
of the Federal Rules by 34 states," however, the exception has
become a majority rule. •
Although the exception now exists in most states, the scope of
the exception is quite limited." There are "significant" limitations
on the use of the exception. 87 Federal Rule 803(18) codifies one of
the more liberal versions of the exception, but even that version is
restricted. To begin with, Rule 803(18) refers only to "treatises,
periodicals, or pamphlets." 88 All the items referred to are written
material. It would stretch the statutory language to extend the
exception to apply to an in-court witness's reference to another
expert's research when no written summary of the research exists.
Like Rule 803(18), Rule 803(6), discussing the business entry ex-
ception, refers only to written matter. Courts have construed the
latter rule as furnishing no authorization for admitting oral business
reports. 89 Further, to come within the explicit parameters of the
statutory exception, material must have been "published." 80 Even a
" Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18) sets out a version of the learned treatise doctrine:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness: Learned treatises—To the extent called to the attention
of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert
witness in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, pe-
riodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or
art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the
witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice.
Id. 803(18).
88 See id.
McColllislcK, supra note 20, § 321 at 900.
" Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Learned Scientific Treatises Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(18), 18 TRIAL, Feb. 1982, at 56 (Alabama, California, Iowa and Wisconsin were
the leading jurisdictions).
"'J
	
IN THE NINETIES, supra note 6, at 26-27.
86 Samuel S. Wilson, Note, Medical Treatises as Evidence—Helpful But Too Strictly Limited,
29 U. CIN. L. REV. 255 (1960).
" McCoamicx, supra note 20, II 321 at 901.
8" FED. R. Evil). 803(18).
89 MCCORMICK, supra note 20, 307.
9° FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
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written, but unpublished, summary of another expert's research is
apparently outside the exception.
Other versions of the learned treatise exception in the United
States are even narrower. For example, some jurisdictions take the
position that to qualify as a learned treatise, the text must be re-
garded as an "authoritative" work in the field. 9 ' In still other juris-
dictions, it is not enough that the text is a "standard" work, 92 the
specific passage in question must also state a fact "of general noto-
riety."93 As a practical matter, this limitation restricts the exception
to judicially noticeable Tacts. 94
In many cases in which the parties have their experts refer to
other researchers' work, the hearsay issue is either overlooked or
at least not litigated." When both sides want their expert witnesses
to refer to such research, it makes good sense to waive the objection.
Otherwise, if one attorney raises the objection to block the opposing
expert's references, in all probability the opposing attorney will
retaliate by making the same objection when the first attorney's
expert attempts to mention the other research supporting his po-
sition. 96 If the hearsay objection is raised and the proponent cannot
point to clear statutory authorization, however, it is highly uncertain
that the judge will permit the expert to go into any detail about
other experts' research. 97
2. The Admissibility of Evidence Relating to the Expert's Minor
Premise
At early common law in the United States, the expert would
have encountered even greater hurdles if she attempted to refer to
hearsay sources of information about her minor premise. Suppose
91 W. Brown Morton, jr., Recent Development, Medical Treatises To Be Admitted as Direct
Evidence in Wisconsin—Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 66 Mimi. L. REV.
183, 183 (1967).
" Note, Learned Treatises, 46 IowA L. REV. 463, 466 (1961).
" See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1341 (Deering 1991).
94 I BERNARD JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 18.7, at 435 (2d ed. 1982);
CALIFORNIA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS, supra note 65, at 285; People v. Conrad, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 421, 430 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
95 See, e.g., Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 263-66 (E.D. Pa. 1990); State v.
Valley, 571 A.2d 579, 581 (Vt. 1989).
" See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & THEODORE V. BLUMOFF, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY: STRAT-
EGY AND TACTICS 4 8:39, at 80 (1986 & Supp. 1991) ("The judge's attitude may be that
'What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.'").
97 E.g., Schuchman v. Stackable, 555 N.E.2d 1012, 1024-26 (Ill, App. Ct. 1990) (expert
not allowed to read excerpts from medical articles during trial).
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that early in the direct examination of an expert in psychiatry, a
psychiatrist testifies about her major premise, the symptomatology
for a certain mental illness. Under the learned treatise exception,
the psychiatrist might be permitted to quote the discussion of the
pertinent diagnostic criteria from a leading psychiatric text. Later
in the same direct examination, the expert begins describing the
information that serves as her minor premise. Assume, for example,
that she spoke with a friend of the subject and that the friend gave
the psychiatrist an oral description of the subject's earlier bizarre
conduct. If the opposing attorney objected on hearsay grounds, at
early common law the judge would have had no choice but to sustain
the objection. The friend's oral statement does not fall within any
traditional hearsay exception, and the prevailing view was that in-
formation could not even serve the limited purpose of furnishing
part of the basis for an expert opinion unless the information was
independently admissible under the hearsay doctrine." The friend's
oral statement could be admitted neither as substantive evidence of
the subject's behavior nor as part of the basis of the expert's opinion
about the subject's mental condition.
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence opposed the
prevailing common-law view. They decided to "bring the judicial
practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when
not in court."" The drafters concluded that as part of an expert's
minor premise, an expert should be able to consider technically
inadmissible hearsay as long as it is the customary practice of the
expert's specialty to do so.'"
This reasoning led the drafters of Federal Rule 703 to provide
that "the facts or data" the expert includes in his minor premise
"need not be admissible in evidence." 10 ' Because Rule 703 does not
purport to fashion another hearsay exception, the opposing party
9° MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 15.
" FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note. The note states:
Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from
numerous sources and of considerable variety, including statements by patients
and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors,
hospital records, and X-rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, but only
with the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various
authenticating witnesses. The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reli-
ance upon them. His validation, expertly performed .. , ought to suffice for
judicial purposes.
Id.
'°° Id.
01 Id. 703.
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is entitled to a limiting instruction under Rule 105 that the infor-
mation is inadmissible as substantive evidence of the facts as-
serted.'" The expert, however, may employ,the information as part
of the basis for his opinion so long as the information is "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts" within the witness' discipline.'"
In a sense, the rules in the United States governing the expert's
major and minor premises are symmetrical. With regard to the
major premise, roughly two thirds of the jurisdictions adhere to the
Frye test for the admissibility of scientific testimony. 134 Under Frye,
the extent of the acceptance of the expert's major premise within
the expert's specialty determines whether the expert may use the
theory as a basis for her testimony.'" The expert may rest her
testimony on the theory if support for the theory is so extensive
that it can be said to be generally accepted. In deciding whether to
permit an expert to factor certain information into her minor prem-
ise, the judge again looks, under Rule 703, to the specialty's custom-
ary practice. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the specialty's custom is
dispositive under Rule 703, as it is under Frye. For example, if the
judge finds that it is the discipline's routine practice to consider a
certain type of information, the judge must allow the witness to rely
on that type of information. The judge cannot second-guess the
discipline and find the practice unreasonable.'"
This superficial symmetry, however, is deceptive. In terms of
the hearsay doctrine, the rules governing the expert's major premise
differ radically from those controlling the minor premise. On the
one hand, many courts vigorously enforce the hearsay rule when
the expert attempts to cite other experts' research and writings as
support for the validity of the witness's major premise. For example,
when the other experts' works assert the validity of the witness's
premise and the proponent offers the references to establish the
truth of that very assertion, the references are arguably hearsay.
The proponent has a solitary, severely circumscribed hearsay ex-
ception to turn to, the learned treatise exception.m On the other
hand, Rule 703 has largely blunted the application of the hearsay
rule to the expert's minor premise. By its terms, the rule announces
'°' Id. 105.
10 Id. 703.
104 See SciErrriFic EVIDENCE, .supra note 9, 1-5.
1" See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Foie test.
109 See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238,275-79 (3d Cir. 1983).
0 ' See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the learned treatise
exception.
December 1991]	 EXPERT—HEARSAY INTERFACE 	 19
that the information an expert factors into his minor premise "need
not be admissible in evidence."'N The accompanying advisory com-
mittee note makes it clear that the rule intentionally obviates any
necessity that the information pass muster under the hearsay doc-
trine. 1 °9
B. The Specific Evidentiary Rules in the Rest of the Common-Law World
The courts in other common-law countries have attempted to
resolve the same expert opinion questions with which courts in the
United States are now struggling. They, however, have answered
the questions in somewhat different fashion. The differences are
due, in part at least, to the other common-law systems' greater
awareness of the interface between expert opinion evidence and
hearsay. 110
1. The Admissibility of Evidence Relating to the Expert's Major
Premise
Suppose that in another common-law jurisdiction, the judge
has already ruled an expert's opinion admissible." At that point,
the identical issue arises that troubles courts in the United States.
When the expert explains her major premise to the trier of fact, to
what extent may the expert refer to other experts' research over a
hearsay objection?
Some common-law jurisdictions have adopted essentially the
same position as the United States. For example, Canadian courts
recognize a limited learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule. " 2
109
	
R. Evm. 703.
1 °9 See id. advisory committee's note.
ii° Ste, e.g., JOHN J. ARCHBOLD ET. AL., PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE 956 (Stephen
Mitchell & P.J. Richardson, eds., 43d ed. 1988); CROSS, supra note 26, at 442; MCWILLIAMS,
supra note 27, at 243; Hollies, supra note 37, at 291; Pattenden, supra note 1, at 89,95-96.
1 " No other common-law jurisdiction subscribes to the Frye general acceptance test for
the admissibility of scientific testimony. Edward J. lmwinkelried, A Comparative Law Analysis
of the Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: The United States Stands Alone, 42 FORENSIC Sc,.
'wet. 15 (1989). The Canadian courts have expressly rejected the general acceptance test.
Id. at 21. Other common-law systems demand that the witness be expert in an organized
body of knowledge. EDWARDS, supra note 41, at 765, 768-70; ALLAN G. WALKER & NORMAN
M.L. WALKER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN SCOTLAND 432 (1964); A.B. WILKINSON, THE SCOT-
TISH LAW OF EVIDENCE 63 (1986). They consequently exclude testimony by astrologers and
witchdoctors. Kenny, supra note 25, at 201. These courts, however, stop short of imposing
an invariable requirement that the specific theory employed by the expert be widely accepted
within the discipline. lmwinkelried, supra, at 25-31.
I " See Calvin S. Goldman, The Use of Learned Treatises in Canadian and United States
Litigation, 24 U. Tottorlro L.J. 423 (1974).
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Similarly, there are early English cases implying that the expert may
refer only to "accepted,"" 3 "standard,""4 or "well-regarded"" 5
texts.
In many contemporary common-law jurisdictions, however, the
courts have recognized a broader hearsay exception. Initially, to
avoid the necessity of explicitly announcing a new hearsay excep-
tion, the courts invoked a number of strained—some would say
fictitious—theories. Some authorities declared that experts could
refer to any texts so long as they "adoptied]" them as part of their
own testimony." 6 Other authorities justified the references to out-
side sources on the theory that the experts were merely "refreshing
recollection."" 7 These theories, however, were transparent because
the courts did not limit experts to consulting summaries of their
own personal research.'" It was evident that experts were using the
texts "in a way not permitted by the normal rules on refreshing
memory. "' 19
In reality, a new, more expansive hearsay exception was emerg-
ing.120 The landmark precedent is the 1983 decision by the Criminal
Division of the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Abadom. 12 i In the
course of committing a robbery, four masked men broke a win-
dow.' 22 The prosecution contended that Abadom was one of the
robbers.' 23 To establish Abadom's identity as a robber, the prose-
cution called two Home Office scientific officers to testify about
glass fragments found in Abadom's shoes.' 24 The experts testified
that they had measured the refractive index of both the glass found
on Abadom's person and the glass from the crime scene.' 25 One
" 3 See Jennifer A. James, A Clear Cut Case, 47 MOD. L. Rev. 103, 107 (1984).
114 See Pattenden, supra note 1, at 94.
" 5 See id. (quoting Eagles v. Orth, [1976] Q.R. 313, 321 (Queens]. 1975)).
118 HOFFMAN & ZEFFERTT, supra note 48, at 101-02; WALKER & WALKER, supra note Il l ,
at 434; see CROSS, supra note 26, at 431.
117 See ARCHBOLD, supra note 110, § 4-298 at 474; MCWILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 241;
SIDNEY L. PHIPSON & DEREK W. ELLIOTT, PHIPSON & ELLIOTT MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 24 (Derek W. Elliott ed., 1 lth ed. 1980).
118 ARCHBOLD, supra note 110, § 4-298 at 474.
119
 PHIPSON & ELLIOTT, supra note 117, at 24.
1" Pattenden, supra note 1, at 93.
121
 [1983] 1 All E.R. 364 (C.A.). For a more detailed discussion of R. v. Abadom, see
James, supra note 113, and Walter Greenwood, Case and Comment, Expert Evidence—Expert
Relying on Material Produced by Other Experts in the Same Field—Whether Excluded by Hearsay
Rule, 1983 CRIM. L. REV. 254 [hereinafter Expert Evidence].
'" (1983) I All E.R. at 365.
128 Id.
124 Id. at 365-66.
128 Id. at 366.
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expert testified that the indices matched. 126 In addition, he alluded
to unpublished Home Office statistics indicating that, over the years,
that particular index had occurred in only 4% of the samples ana-
lyzed.'" The defense challenged the allusion on the ground that it
represented inadmissible hearsay. 128
One commentator has noted that, in Abadom, it was patent that
"as a matter of common sense, the statistical tables should have been
admitted."' 29 As this commentator remarked, "[a] legal system
which would . . . rule out such cogent evidence as the Home Office
statistic[s] [could not] be defended.""° The statistics had been com-
piled in a reliable manner,"' and they shed important light on the
significance of the glass fragments discovered on the defendant's
person. Nevertheless, whether the law permitted their admission
was "in doubt."' 32 The result was that the probative value of the
statistics in Abadom proved that the rules governing the interface
between expert opinion and hearsay were in need of revision.'"
The Court of Appeal overruled the hearsay objection and upheld
the propriety of the reference to the Home Office statistics.'"
Although commentators have criticized the Abadom court's at-
tempts to distinguish earlier, more restrictive opinions,'" Abadom
and kindred decisions have substantially liberalized the common-
law rule. It is now settled that in explaining the major premise,
experts are not limited to published material.'" Moreover, this
common-law rule may not be limited necessarily to written material.
For example, a South African court permitted a fingerprint expert
to cite the general experience of other members of his office to
support his position that , seven points of identity suffice for a
match."' Nor is the new rule confined to criminal cases such as
126 Id.
127 Id.
126 Id. at 366-67.
129 James, supra note 113, at 107.
ISO Id, at 104.
171 Id. at 106.
'" Id. at 107.
18s
124 R, v. Abadom, [19831 1 All E.R. 364, 369 (C.A.).
155 James, supra note 113, at 104-06.
130 See id. at 106 ("The court added that the fact this material had not been published
did not disentitle the expert from relying thereon."); ADRIAN KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF
EVIDENCE 370 (2d ed. 1989); Expert Evidence, supra note 121, at 255 ("It was not necessary
that such material should have been published.").
137 HOFFMAN & ZEFFER rr, supra note 48, at 101 (citing S. v. Kimimbi, 1963 (3) S.A. 250
(C)).
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Abadom. In civil cases involving the valuation of property, an expert
has been allowed to refer to "reports of auctions and other dealings,
and information obtained from his professional brethren," as well
as written textbooks and journals.'"
The Abadom court strove mightily to reconcile its holding with
earlier precedents.' 39 Professor Pattenden, however, is correct in
asserting that on its facts Abadom signals the advent of a new hearsay
exception "peculiar to expert witnesses which enables them to give
substantive evidence of technical material of a general nature" to
support their major premise. 14° The exception is broad enough to
enable an expert to rely on "any relevant"' 41
 research material "he
chooses" 142 to persuade the trier of fact that the expert's underlying
theory is valid. This exception is far broader than the learned
treatise exception codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18).
2. The Admissibility of Evidence Relating to the Expert's Minor
Premise
Assume arguendo that an expert has concluded his testimony
about his general theory or technique. Before stating his ultimate
opinion relevant to the merits of the case, the expert proposes to
list the case-specific facts in his minor premise. These are the facts
to which the expert will apply the theory or technique. At this point,
may the expert refer to information about the case-specific facts
from otherwise inadmissible hearsay sources? In many common-law
jurisdictions, the answer to that question must be tentative because
the law is in flux,' 43 Some generalizations, however, are possible.
The Australian and Canadian courts have embraced a position
similar to that adopted in the United States.'" The Canadian court's
decision in Wilband v. The Queen is illustrative.' 45 There, the question
presented was whether a psychiatrist could rely on hearsay sources
138
 Pattenden, supra note 1, at 93 (citing English Exporters (London) Ltd. v. Eldonwall
Ltd. 119731 1 Ch. 415,420 (1972)); see also P.B. CARTER, CASES AND STATUTES ON EVIDENCE
522 (1981); KEANE, supra note 136, at 369 (a "professional valuer" may rely on information
"obtained from professional colleagues").
"9 See James, supra note 113, at 104-06.
140 Pattenden, supra note 1, at 90.
' 1 KEANE, supra note 136, at 370.
MCWILLIAMS, supra note 27, at '256 (quoting R. v. Anderson, 16 D.L.R. 203 (Alta.
1914)).
11 ' Hollies, supra note 37, at 302-03.
'" See Pattenden, supra note 1, at 87-88.
115 [19671 S.C.R. 14 (Can. 1966).
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of information about the conduct of the person being evaluated. 146
Among other sources, the psychiatrist had examined the person's
prison files. 147 The court held that the expert's reliance on such
hearsay sources was proper.'"
The court advanced several arguments for its holding. One
argument was that the expert's consideration of these "second-
hand" sources was "according to recognized normal psychiatric pro-
cedures."49 The argument runs that, in forming opinions for the
courtroom, the expert should be permitted and encouraged to fol-
low "recognized professional procedures."'" That argument is, of
course, reminiscent of the claim by the drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence that "the judicial practice [should be brought] into line
with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court."'"
Another argument is that when used for such a limited pur-
pose, the information is nonhearsay. The expert refers to the in-
formation for the limited purpose of explaining why he formed his
opinion.' 62 Employed for that purpose, the information supposedly
has "no hearsay quality."'" The proponent is not offering the in-
formation as substantive evidence of the truth of the information.' 54
The proponent asserts that the information is offered merely to
demonstrate that the expert had a substantial basis for his opinion
and acted reasonably in forming the opinion. The proponent is
invoking a variation of the "mental input" theory, and claims that
the psychiatrist's receipt of the report about the subject's behavior
makes the ultimate opinion better founded and more credible.'" if
the information is not being treated as proof of the truth of the
assertion, it is not subject to exclusion under the hearsay rule.'" At
146 Id. at 18.
t" Id.
"6 Id. at 21-22.
1 ' 9 M. at 19.
McWILLtAms, supra note 27, at 252 (quoting Phillion v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R.
18, 24 (Can. 1977)); see also Hugh Silverman, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Law, 14 CIUM.
L.Q. 145, '165-66 (197l-72) ("it' we recognize that he is an expert . . . we must take into
account his techniques for gathering information").
151
	
R. Evil). 704 advisory committee's note.
142 KEANE, supra note 136, at 369-70; Pattenden, supra note 1, at 96. The court in
Wilband, however, noted that "the information gathered from prison files was not considered
by the two psychiatrists as having any real significance in the formation of their opinion,
which was grounded ultimately on the examinations of the appellant and the evidence given
at the hearing of the application." Wilband, [1967] S.C.R. at 21.
1" Pattenden, supra note 1, at 86-87.
. ,54
 Id. at 86.
1" EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES, supra note 6, at 578.
166 KEANE, supra note 136, at 369.
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the opponent's request, the judge would give the jury "a careful
charge" about the limited use of the information,' 57 but the hearsay
objection would be overruled.
While Wilband is powerful precedent for the limited use of
hearsay information as a basis for expert opinion, it would be an
overstatement to assert that all types of Canadian experts may now
follow the practice codified in Federal Rule 703. More recent Ca-
nadian authorities state that when the factual premises of an ex-
pert's minor premise are not established by other evidence permit-
ted under the exclusionary rules, "the expert's opinion must be
rejected as irrelevant." 158
 Further, both Australian and Canadian
cases teach that if admissible evidence corroborating the hearsay
report is not forthcoming, the expert opinion has "little signifi-
cance." 59
 Some Canadian decisions use the expression, "little if any
probative value."'"
More importantly, Wilband is at odds with other leading com-
mon-law authorities outside the United States.'" Many common-
law authorities maintain a conservative attitude toward the bases of
expert opinion evidence.' 62
 These courts perceive a clear distinction
between the application of the hearsay rule to the expert's major
and minor premises. It is one thing to allow a psychiatrist to rely
on hearsay sources for the criteria for diagnosing a particular men-
tal illness. It is quite another, more problematic, matter to permit
the psychiatrist to rely on what a person's acquaintances told the
expert about the person's state of health.' 63
 Although it may have
been justifiable in Abaci= to permit the Home Office expert to refer
to the statistics about the incidence of various refractive indices,'"
the court could have held quite consistently that "if [the expert] had
not himself determined the index [of the glass found in Abadom's
shoes,] it would have been necessary to call someone who had
[personally] done so." 165
' 57 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 252 (quoting R. v. Abbey, [19821 2 S.C.R. 24 (Can.)).
158
 Ellis S. Magner, Exclusion of Polygraph Evidence: Can It Be Justified? 30 CRIM. L.Q. 412,
423 (1987-88).
' 88
 Pattenden, supra note I, at 87,88 n.23.
16° Hollies, supra note 37, at 295 (citing Schofield v. Macintosh, 29 W.W.R. 572 (B.C.
1959)).
' 6' See, e.g., Hollies, supra note 37, at 303; Silverman, supra note 150, at 166-67.
162 See,	 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 245-46 (summarizing Canadian cases re-
stricting use of expert opinion evidence).
165
 PHIPSON & ELLIOTT, supra note 117, at 25.
' 64
 Expert Evidence, supra note 121, at 254.
165 Id. at 255.
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The preponderant view in the common-law world is that the
expert may not factor information into her minor premise unless
the information is admissible under the hearsay rule.' 66 Leading
contemporary authorities in England' 67 and other common-law sys-
tems such as New Zealand,'" Scotland'"° and South Africa"° pro-
claim that each fact in the expert's minor premise must be proven
by admissible evidence. This rule is regarded as an "elementary
principle"'" in most common-law systems. 172
The trial procedures reflect the rule. The hypothetical question
is not only a permissible method of eliciting expert testimony,'" in
many circles, it is still viewed as the preferred method of presenting
expert opinion." 4 At some stage of the trial, the expert's proponent
must present admissible evidence aliunder 75 to prove the existence
of the facts in the expert's minor premise.'" If the proponent
neglects to introduce such evidence, the expert's opinion. is not
entitled to any weight'" and "must be discarded."'" The practice
does not appear to be universal; 179 but in some common-law courts,
the judge instructs the jury that if they determine as a matter of
fact that one of the premises in the expert's minor premise is untrue,
they are to reject the opinion as well.'"
Of the common-law jurisdictions, the United States has seem-
ingly adopted the most conservative position on the question of the
166
	 supra note 136, at 369.
167 Id.; C.D. NOKES, supra note 32, at 180; PHIPSON, supra note 27, at 804; SIDNEY L.
PHIPSON & DEREK W. ELLIOTT, PHIPSON'S MANUAL OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 86 (Derek W.
Elliott ed., 10th ed. 1972); I-follies, supra note 37, at 292 (citing ERNEST COCKLE, COCKLE'S
CASES AND STATUTES IN EVIDENCE 95 (10th ed. 1963)); Kenny, supra note 25, at 199 ("the
opinion of scientific men upon proven facts"); L. Norman Williams, Case and Comment,
1975 Oust. L. REV. 98,99.
' 6" CROSS, supra note 26, at 430.
169 WILKINSON, supra note III, at 65 ("that basis must be established aleunde").
175 HOFFMAN & ZEFFERTT, supra note 48, at 101 ("on the basis of facts proved' by others").
171 CARTER, supra note 138, at 510.
122 Pattenden, supra note 1, at 88.
175 See, e.g., HOFFMAN & ZEFFERTT, supra note 48, at 101-02; KEANE, Supra note 136, at
369; PHIPSON & Et.tiorr, supra note 117, at 25.
124 See CROSS, supra note 26, at 442 (problems "can be avoided . . by the use of
hypothetical questions"); PHIPSON'S MANUAL, supra note 167, at 87.
176 WILKINSON, supra note I 1 1, at 65.
126 Pattenden, supra note 1, at 86-87.
122. See MCWILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 252 (quoting R. v. Abbey, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24
(Can.)); PETER K. MCWILLIAMS, CANADIAN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 75 (Supp. 1986) [hereinafter
CANADIAN CRIMINAL. EVIDENCE].
129 HOFFMAN & ZEFFERTT, supra note 48, at 102; see also Pattenden, supra note 1, at 96.
1 " Pattenden, supra note I, at 87.
1110 CANADIAN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 177, at 75 (Supp. 1986).
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application of the hearsay rule to the expert's major premise. While
other common-law systems recognize a broad exception enabling
the expert to inform the trier of the research data supporting the
expert's theory, most United States jurisdictions adhere to a very
limited learned treatise exception. Among the common-law juris-
dictions, however, the United States has taken the most liberal po-
sition on the issue of the interface between the hearsay rule and
the expert's minor premise. Many common-law systems insist that
the expert's minor premise be based on admissible evidence. Quite
to the contrary, Federal Rule 703 has eviscerated the hearsay rule's
application to this component of the expert's reasoning process.
Under Rule 703, even if the information in question would other-
wise be deemed blatantly inadmissible hearsay, the expert may fac-
tor the information into her minor premise if it is her specialty's
custom to consider that type of information.
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
SPECIFIC EVIDENTIARY RULES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THOSE IN
THE REST OF THE COMMON-LAW WORLD
Section I described the common rationale, shared by the United
States and the balance of the common-law world, underlying the
rules of opinion evidence. Section II pointed out, however, there
are pronounced differences between the specific evidentiary rules
implementing the rationale in the United States and in many other
common-law systems. This section evaluates those differences from
a comparativist perspective.
A. The Differences in the Rules Relating to the Expert's Major Premise
Necessity justifies admitting expert opinion evidence based on
hearsay.' 81 The assumption is that by virtue of her special knowl-
edge and skill, an expert is better able to draw an inference than a
lay judge or juror. The expert contributes to the fact finding process
by assisting the trier of fact to determine more intelligently whether
to draw a contested inference.
Empirical studies concerning the reliability of expert and lay
testimony suggest not only that the expert testimony should be
admissible, but also, more importantly, that the courts should be
relatively receptive to expert opinion evidence. There is undeniably
181 Pattenden, supra note 1, at 93.
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a margin of error in expert testimony, including scientific evi-
dence.'" Experts are hardly infallible.'" Nevertheless, the psycho-
logical studies have documented an even greater margin of error
in lay eyewitness testimony. 184 The judgment to admit expert opin-
ion evidence must be comparative; to the extent we restrict the
admissibility of expert testimony, we force the courts to rely on
other types of evidence that may be even less reliable.'" In short,
the evidentiary rules should permit the admission of expert testi-
mony with some liberality.
If expert testimony, particularly scientific evidence, is to be
admissible, the courts must permit the expert witness to rely, at least
implicitly, on hearsay reports of other experts' research. Given the
proliferation of scientific knowledge in this century, "no scientist]
.. can possibly have firsthand knowledge of all the data comprising
his field."'" In his education and work life, the expert is exposed
to innumerable oral and written reports involving a vast mass of
accumulated research.' 87 Even if he is an active researcher, the data
the expert has personally compiled represents only a minute frac-
tion of the corpus of knowledge the expert uses in his professional
work. 188 Inevitably, the witness is bound to rely on other experts'
validation of theories that the expert witness uses to develop and
support his major premise.' 89 It would be absurd to require the
1" Numerous articles have collected the proficiency studies documenting the existence
of a disturbing margin of error in expert testimony. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal
Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV. 791, 795-97 (1991); Paul C. Giannelli,
The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of Scientific Proof, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 671, 688-92 (1988); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the
Foundation for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a Cause of
Forensic Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 25-27 (1991); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard
for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique From the Perspective ofJuror Psychology, 28 Vim.. L.
REv. 554, 560-62 (1982-83) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting ScientOc
Evidence]; Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence—A Primer
on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 267-69 (1981).
1 " MCWILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 245.
184 Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence, supra note 182, at 565–
66.
188 Id. at 564.
1" Ronald M. Dick, Hearsay Evidence in Expert Opinions, 8 J. POLICE SCI. 8[ ADMIN. 378,
382 (1980).
1 " HOFFMAN & ZEFFERTT, supra note 48, at 101; L.R.C. Haward, A Psychologist's Contri-
bution to Legal Procedure, 27 Moo. L. REV. 656, 662 (1964) ("the psychologist [calls upon) ..
the accumulated wealth of factual knowledge produced by psychological experimentation
over the past century"); Expert Evidence, supra note 121, at 255.
188 Pattenden, supra note 1, at 93-94.
1 " MCWILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 241; James, supra note 113, at 105; Expert Evidence,
supra note 121, at 255.
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witness to repeat all the experiments needed to verify every prop-
osition in his major premise.'"
The crucial policy question is whether the courts should allow
the witness to discuss explicitly the other experts' research. The
status quo in American hearsay law makes it difficult for the expert
to do so. Is the status quo desirable? As many common-law com-
mentators have noted, when a judge decides to admit expert testi-
mony, the real task is ensuring that the trier of fact properly eval-
uates the weight of the testimony. 19 ' As Judge Hand observed in
his classic article, that task is challenging precisely because the trier
of fact lacks the expert's knowledge and ski11. 192
The strict application of the hearsay rule to the expert's major
premise compounds the trier of fact's difficulty in properly evalu-
ating expert testimony. By greatly restricting the expert's ability to
elaborate on the research underlying her major premise, laws in
the United States force the trier of fact to decide whether to accept
the expert's ultimate opinion as an ipse dixit. It is hardly surprising
that studies of American jury behavior indicate that, in deciding
whether to accept an expert's testimony, jurors frequently rely heav-
ily on the expert's demeanor and presentational style.'" Jurors,
denied the underlying research data, thus focus on factors that have
no relation to the scientific merit of the witness's major premise.
Unfortunately, the witness's demeanor may not be a good indicator
of the witness's credibility and acumen.'"
Other common-law jurisdictions have relaxed the application
of the hearsay rule to an expert's major premise because they believe
that it is critical to furnish the trier of fact with "the necessary
scientific criteria" to assess the expert's theory.' 95
 The scientific va-
Imwinkelried, The 'Bases' of Expert Testimony, supra note 12, at 9. The author writes:
Would we require a modern accident reconstruction expert to replicate New-
ton's seventeenth century experiments to derive the laws of motion? Suppose
that a physicist is testifying about the safety of a nuclear power plant. If the
physicist contemplates relying on the works of Fermi or Oppenheimer, would
we require that the physicist duplicate their research? Imposing that require-
ment would effectively bar all scientific testimony. To put the matter bluntly,
permitting scientific witnesses to consider the theories and studies of other
researchers is an absolute necessity.
Id.
MI See CARTER, supra note 138, at 502-03; HOFFMAN & ZEFFERTT, supra note 48, at 88-
89; WILKINSON, supra note 111, at 67.
192 See Hand, supra note 50, at 42-49.
195 Kenneth K. Sereno, Source Credibility, 28 J. FORENSIC Sm. 532,534-35 (1983).
' 94 See Olin G. Wellborn, III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075,1078-91 (1991).
' 95 CROSS, supra note 26, at 431; see Hammelmann, supra note 27, at 33. See generally
Basten, supra note 28.
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lidity of a theory turns on the extent and caliber of its experimental
verification. 196 It is the trier's responsibility to evaluate the quality
of the expert's reasoning process. 197 The trier of fact can do so in
a meaningful fashion only with the benefit of the pertinent research
data. 198 The trier needs to know the size and composition of the
research database, the conditions under which the experiments
were conducted, and the validity rate attained in the experiments.
The practice in many civil-law countries is in accord with the prac-
tice in these common-law jurisdictions. In many civil-law jurisdic-
tions, the court's expert provides the trier of fact with a report,
detailing the related research, experiments and investigations.'"
As previously stated, the United States has taken perhaps the
most conservative position of the common-law jurisdictions on the
application of the hearsay doctrine to the expert's major premise.
The other common-law jurisdictions, however, appear to have the
better approach. A comparative analysis strongly suggests that the
American jurisdictions ought to reappraise and significantly expand
their narrow learned treatise exception.'"
B. The Differences in the Rules Relating to the Expert's Minor Premise
The preceding subsection pointed out that the basic justification
for the admission of expert testimony is a necessity rationale. That
is, the expert has a special ability to draw an inference beyond a
layperson's competence, or at least to draw the inference more
reliably. The expert possesses that ability because she has knowledge
or skill exceeding that of the typical layperson. As section I empha-
sized, the expert's special ability relates to the major premise in the
expert's reasoning. The expert's knowledge and skill enable the
196 ERNEST SNYDER, HISTORY OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 21 (1969); Haward, supra note
187, at 667; Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence—An Alternative to the Frye
Rule, 25 WM. & MARY E. REV. 545, 556 (1984); Sheri L. Gronhovd, Note, Social Science
Statistics in the Courtroom: The Debate Resurfaces in McCleskey v. Kemp, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 688, 690-91 (1987).
m See Sir Roger Ormrod, Scientific Evidence in Court, 1968 Calm. L. REV. 240, 244-46.
"8 Schuchman v. Stackable, 555 N.E.2d 1012, 1031-32 (III. App. Ct. 1990) (Chapman,
J., dissenting).
109 Hammelmann, supra note 27, at 37.
'< 0° Cf. Pattenden, supra note 1, at 93 (accepting a broad exception to hearsay because
an expert opinion will be built on non-first hand evidence, including both written and oral
work by others in that profession); James, supra note 113, at 107 (hearsay exception for
unpublished search report prepared by third party and used by expert); Expert Evidence,
supra note 121, at 255 (hearsay exception for unpublished material on which expert bases
opinion).
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expert to supply the theory or principle needed to properly evaluate
the case-specific data. The preceding subsection argued that the
necessity rationale justifies relaxing the application of the hearsay
rule to the research data supporting the expert's major premise.
The necessity rationale, however, is not applicable to the infor-
mation constituting the expert's minor premise. Expert testimony
can be presented without rendering the hearsay rule inapplicable
to the expert's minor premise. Without the benefit of Rule 703,
which exempts an expert's minor premise from hearsay scrutiny,
United States courts admitted expert testimony for decades through
the mechanism of the hypothetical question."' Several United States
jurisdictions have refused to adopt Rule 703, and continue to insist
that the expert's proponent 'prove each element of the expert's
minor premise with admissible evidence. 202 As section II pointed
out, many other common-law countries still demand admissible ev-
idence of the expert's minor premise. The experience of those
jurisdictions demonstrates that there is no true necessity for a pro-
vision such as Rule 703. A common-law system can successfully
administer a set of expert opinion rules without abandoning the
hearsay rule.
Of course, a provision such as Rule 703 arguably still might be
desirable, even if not justified by necessity. That argument, however,
has serious weaknesses. If made at the turn of the century, when
Judge Hand wrote his article about expert opinion evidence, the
argument would have had substantial merit. At that point in time,
"' McCoamtcu, supra note 20, §* 14-15 at 39-40.
2132 Id. 15 at 38-39. Minnesota's version of Rule 703 has been amended by the addition
of the following provision:
(b) Underlying data must be independently admissible in order to be received
upon direct examination; provided that when good cause is shown in civil cases
and the underlying data is particularly trustworthy, the court may admit the
data under this rule for the limited purpose of showing the basis for the expert's
opinion.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 50, Evidence 703(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). The Minnesota amend-
ment became effective January I, 1990. Id. See EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES, supra note 6, at
538.
Similarly the rules in Michigan and Ohio reject Rule 703's permissive approach to the
use of potentially inadmissible evidence in an expert's minor premise:
In Michigan, the first sentence of Rule 703 is identical to that in the Federal
Rule, but the second sentence was omitted and the following substituted: "The
court may require that underlying facts or data essential to an opinion or
inference be in evidence." Ohio adopted a one sentence rule requiring that the
facts or data on which an expert bases his or her opinion either have been
perceived by the expert or admitted in evidence at the hearing.
;JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 22, § 52.2 at 1.
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a proponent of Rule 703 might have noted that a good deal of
trustworthy information was technically inadmissible under the
hearsay rule. Given that the hearsay doctrine was strictly applied at
that time, the Rule 703 advocate reasonably could have argued that
such information was not necessarily untrustworthy simply because
it could not run the hearsay gauntlet.
During this century, however, United States jurisdictions have
substantially liberalized the hearsay doctrine. Although the United
States has not gone as far as some other common-law systems, 2"
the barriers to the admission of hearsay evidence under the Federal
Rules of Evidence are much more lax that their United States
common-law antecedents. In a single legislative stroke, the Federal
Rules of Evidence relaxed the foundational requirements for some
traditional exceptions, 204 recognized new exceptions,"5 and created
open-ended residual exceptions. 206 Today, most hearsay is admit-
ted. 207 American evidence scholars are now discussing seriously the
question of whether there has been a de facto abolition of the hearsay
rule. 208 If hearsay information cannot pass muster under these new,
relaxed standards, there is good reason to question its reliability. At
the turn of the century, a Rule 703 proponent plausibly could have
contended that the receipt of many "technically inadmissible" items
of hearsay would enhance the reliability of the trier's factual find-
ings. The reform of the hearsay rule in the United States, however,
has deprived that contention of much of its force.
Today, most other common-law systems refuse to treat an ex-
pert's willingness to rely on a report relating the facts of the instant
case as a sufficient guarantee of the trustworthiness of the report. 2"
As section I noted, an expert is not viewed as an official fact finder")
4" See, e.g., CROSS & WILKINS, supra note 28, at 154-55; Di Birch, Documentary Evidence,
1989 Canes. L. REV. 15; R.A. Clark, The Changing Face of the Rule Against Hearsay in English
Law, 21 AKRON L. REV. 67 (1987).
tod E.g., FED, R. Evil). 804(b)(2) advisory committee's note (the dying declaration excep-
tion).
202 E.g., id. 803(1) advisory committee's note (the present sense impression exception).
206 E.g., id. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
207 Ronald Allen, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1992) ("most hearsay comes in"); Christopher Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay
Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (citing the Younger
article, infra, the author asserts that "most hearsay gets in"); Irving Younger, Reflections on
the Rule Against Hearsay, 32 S.C. L. Rev. 281, 293 (1980) ("Hearsay is usually admitted.").
2°2 Eleanor Swift, Has the Hearsay Rule Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
"9 See supra notes 158-76 and accompanying text.
YOU Hollies, supra note 37, at 290.
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with a superior ability to determine credibility. For example, it is
true that a physician is more capable than a layperson of determin-
ing whether a rash is a symptom for a particular disease. Assume,
however, that an acquaintance of the patient tells the physician that
a week earlier he saw a rash on the patient's arm. Is the physician,
qua expert, better able than a juror or judge to determine the
truthfulness of the acquaintance's report? "Does the physician's
medical degree make the physician a better judge of character than
a judge or jury? A physician's medical school coursework does not
include any specialized training in determining credibility." 2 " There
are no residencies or internships in assessing truthfulness. If the
physician were to make that determination, the physician would be
stepping into the shoes of the factfinder. 212 Making such a deter-
mination is not the essence of the physician's expertise. Precisely
because the expert is exceeding his expertise, the law should not
indulge in any presumption of the reliability of the expert's deter-
mination.
Not only is the benefit of Rule 703 dubious, but there are also
significant costs attached—costs that are higher in the United States
than they are in any other common-law system. When a judge
invokes Rule 703, permitting an expert to mention otherwise in-
admissible hearsay statements in the testimony about her minor
premise, there are two distinct possibilities of the misuse of evi-
dence. One possibility is that the jury will improperly treat the case-
specific information as substantive evidence of the facts asserted. If
a judge admits such evidence under Rule 703 in a jury trial, the
judge must give the jurors a limiting instruction, specifying the
permissible and impermissible uses of the evidence. 213 It is doubtful
211 Imwinkelried, The Bases' of Expert Testimony, supra note 12, at 11. The author concedes
that "in some exceptional cases, the expert can determine the facts constituting the minor
premise more reliably than a lay trier." Id. Nevertheless, the author argues that even in those
cases, the expert's superior ability is largely a product of her mastery of the theories and
principles that function as major premises. Id. Suppose, by way of example, that the patient
claims to have experienced symptoms A, B, C and E. The physician realizes that the literature
indicates that "the presence of symptom E is an exclusionary diagnostic criterion for the
other symptoms which the patient claims." Id. In this fact situation, the expert could probably
evaluate the patient's credibility more effectively than a lay juror could. Nevertheless, the
key is the expert's knowledge of the general diagnostic criteria; even in this case, it would
be a mistake to leap to the conclusion that the expert is an inherently superior analyst of
credibility questions.
212 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1368 (E.D.
Pa. 1980), rev'd, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
212 FED. R. EV1D. 105.
December 1991]	 EXPERT—HEARSAY INTERFACE	 33
whether such a limiting instruction is effective.'" Distinguished
evidence scholars acknowledge that it can be difficult to distinguish
a hearsay from a nonhearsay use of evidence. 215 Even after several
hours of class discussion devoted exclusively to the definition of
hearsay, law students find it difficult to make that distinction. Be-
cause lay jurors have not received any formal instruction on the
hearsay definition, there is reason to doubt that they can routinely
perform the mental gymnastics of using Rule 703 information only
in their consideration of the adequacy of the basis of the expert's
opinion.
More fundamentally, there is a grave risk that the jury will
misuse the expert's ultimate opinion. When the expert testifies syll-
ogistically, her testimony is conditional. For example, she may tell
the jury that if symptoms A, B and C, are present in the subject's
case history, the subject is likely laboring under mental illness D.
Suppose that the expert's proponent presents no admissible evi-
dence of symptom C but that, under Rule 703, the judge permits
the expert to refer to inadmissible hearsay about symptom C. The
judge gives the jury the customary limiting instruction that they
may not treat the information as substantive proof of C. Following
the spirit of Rule 703 rather than the practice abroad, however, the
judge will probably not instruct the jury that they must ignore the
expert's opinion unless there is admissible evidence of C. The expert
has said that her opinion obtains only if symptoms A, B and C are
present, but there is no competent evidence of C and the judge
seemingly still invites the jury to treat the opinion as substantive
evidence of mental illness D. A Canadian commentator was guilty
H4 See generally Daniel D. Blinka, Delusion or Despair: The Concept of Limited Admissibility
in the Law of Evidence, 13 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 781 (1989). Numerous psychological studies
question the efficacy of limiting instructions. James E. Beaver & Steven L. Marques, A Proposal
to Modify the Rule on Criminal Conviction Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585, 602 (1985); Roselle
L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior
Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985); Ed Gainor, Note,
Character Evidence by Any Other Name . . . : A Proposal to Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction
Under Rule 609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762, 764, 791 (1990); Lisa Eichhorn, Note, Social
Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 347-49 (1989); David S. Prince, Note, Enhancing Penalties
by Admitting "Bad Character" Evidence During the Guilt Phase of Criminal Trials—State v. Bishop,
1989 UTAH L. REV. 1013, 1017-19 (summarizing the studies). But see Evlyn Goldstein Schaefer
& Kristine L. Hansen, Similar Fact Evidence and Limited Use Instructions: An Empirical Investi-
gation, 14 CRIM. L.J. 157, 173-75 (1990).
213 E.g., RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
304-08 (1989); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES 137 (1988).
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of only slight exaggeration when he charged that this practice puts
the jury in a "quite impossible" position. 216
These problems are probably of acute concern only in jury
proceedings. 217
 A judge would be intimately familiar with the con-
cept of a nonhearsay use of evidence, and the judge is unlikely to
attach much weight to an opinion conditioned on the existence of
a certain factor when there is no admissible evidence of the factor. 218
Although the jury trial is on the wane in the United States, 219
 we
still conduct more jury trials than any other country, including other
common-law systems. 22° Nearly all the civil jury trials in the world
are conducted in the United States. 221
 Even in England, the birth-
place of the common-law jury, the civil jury has virtually disap-
peared. 222
 It would certainly be practical to implement Rule 703 in
a common-law system that had largely eliminated the institution of
the jury trial. In a different jurisdiction employing bench proceed-
ings, the risks of misuse of evidence would be minimal and Rule
703 might work well. The anomaly, however, is that with its con-
tinuing commitment to jury trial, the United States is the common-
law jurisdiction where Rule 703, by creating the greatest risks, exacts
the highest cost.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article does not purport to explicate a definitive analysis
of the interface between hearsay and expert opinion law in the
United States. This article hopefully has shown, however, that the
United States treats that interface very differently than many other
common-law systems. The existence of such material differences
should give us pause.
216 Hollies, supra note 37, at 303.
Pattenden, supra note I, at 88-89.
2" Id.
2" See Kenneth C. Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. Rev. 1362, 1363-64
(1970); Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.A. J. 723,
723, 726 (1964); F.R. Lacy, "Civilizing" Nonjury Trials, 19 VAND, L. REV. 73, 73 (1965); John
H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cm. L. Rev. 823, 864 n.147
(1985).
220
 Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 135, 135-36 (1972), reprinted in JoHN H. MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE
LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 720-21 (1978).
nl Id.
. n2
 Benjamin Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions of English Civil
Procedure, 69 Mmx. L. REv. 821, 830 (1971).
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A comparative analysis suggests that with respect to experts'
major premises, evidence law in the United States has not gone far
enough in pursuing the logic of the basic rationale for admitting
expert testimony. If scientific testimony is to be admitted, courts
must allow an expert to rely at least implicitly on the research of
other experts. Further, if the trier of fact is to intelligently evaluate
the expert's major premise, evidence law must allow the expert to
elaborate on the research data supporting the premise. A strict
application of the hearsay rule to this research information deprives
the trier of fact of information essential to a meaningful appraisal
of the validity of the expert's major premise. In Abadom, the English
court wisely realized that the hearsay rule should not be extended
to preclude an expert from acquainting the trier of fact with the
research underlying her expertise. In so doing, the court paved the
way for the recognition of a new, broader hearsay exception pecu-
liar to expert testimony. The United States should follow suit.
A comparative analysis also indicates, however, that United
States jurisdictions have gone too far in relaxing the application of
the hearsay rule to information comprising an expert's minor prem-
ise. These jurisdictions have misconceived the rationale for admit-
ting expert testimony. The rationale does not posit that, as a general
proposition, an expert is a superior analyst of facts or credibility.
As the experience of other common-law jurisdictions demonstrates,
there is no need to abandon the rule that evidence of the facts
contained in the expert's minor premise must be admissible. Can-
ada, the jurisdiction that has adopted the position closest to that of
the United States, is considering reinstating the traditional, com-
mon-law view. Minnesota, the United States jurisdiction that most
recently revised its version of Rule 703, has also moved back toward
the original common-law practice.
The interface between expert opinion and hearsay is indeed "a
minefield" for the courts in the common-law world. While courts
in the United States have taken one path through the minefield,
most of the other common-law jurisdictions have chosen a different
route. This article suggests that the route chosen by the majority of
common-law courts is more consistent with the fundamental ration-
ale for admitting expert opinion. It is time for courts in the United
States to rethink their position, for our stance on these issues is at
once too conservative and too liberal.
